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The Energy Reform
in Mexico

Lessons and Warnings from International Law
BY GUILLERMO J. GARCIA SANCHEZ

Abstract

THE ARTICLE ANALYZES some
of the contents of the Mexican energy
reform of 2013 and warns on the international legal implications that the path that
Mexico has chosen to follow could bring
to its economy and international relations.
Concretely, it argues that in order to avoid
falling into the same mistakes made by
other Latin American countries in the region, Mexico must consider its obligations
contained in international treaties signed
with the United States on transboundary
resources as well as its obligations in bilateral investment treaties that protect foreign
investors from certain government acts and
policies.
In December 2013, the international
media reported, to the surprise of many,
that the Mexican Congress approved an energy reform that will radically transform a
seventy-year-old state-oriented policy that
was an essential part of Mexico’s national
identity.1 The central theme of this article

is to analyze some of the contents of this
reform and to make a cautious warning on
some of the international legal implications
that the path that Mexico has chosen to
follow could bring to its economy and to its
international relations. Concretely, the article argues that the legislative process that
will implement the energy reform in the
upcoming months needs to attend to two
elements regarding Mexico’s international
legal obligations: the provisions contained
in the 2012 Agreement Between the United
States of America and Mexico Concerning
Transboundary Hydrocarbon Reservoirs in
the Gulf of Mexico (the 2012 Treaty)2 and
the obligations contained in several bilateral investment treaties (BITs) signed by
Mexico that protect foreign investors from
certain government acts and policies. Other states in the region have gone down this
path before and for a diversity of reasons
have ignored the international obligations
to which they agreed, triggering numerous
disputes and conflicts that eventually cost
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millions in damages and compensations.
Mexico has the chance to learn from the
mistakes of its peers in the region and even
to be institutionally creative in the way it
assumes its international obligations in
the future; otherwise, the story of States
repenting years later will repeat itself, to the
detriment of Mexico’s national finances.

The Energy Reform of 2013

Before addressing the international law
aspect of the reform, it is important to understand the essence of the constitutional
amendment.3 The most important aspect
in relation to this article is the fact that
the energy reform amended the Mexican
Constitution to open up the possibility for
the Mexican State to sign contracts with
private parties, including multinationals,
for the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbon resources (article 27). Before the
reform, only Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex),
the State-owned petroleum company, could
conduct these activities on behalf of the
State. The Constitution still prohibits the
signing of concession agreements, but in
the transitory articles, it allows the State to
sign a variety of contracts that were forbidden before. For example, the reform affirms
that the State can sign joint profit and production contracts, service contracts, and
licenses with private companies (transitory
provision 4). The transitory provisions
also mention that the State can pay the
private party: cash, in the case of service
contracts; a percentage of the profit, in the
case of joint profit agreements; a percentage of the production, for joint production
agreements; and an onerous transfer of the
hydrocarbons once they have been extracted, for the license agreements; or a combination of all of the above. The decision on
which contract will be adopted according
to the reform depends on the one that will
maximize the government’s income in the
long term. In terms of the authorities in
charge of implementing the reform, the
Secretary of Energy, the National Com-
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mission on Hydrocarbons, and the Energy
Regulatory Commission have joint powers
to execute and regulate different aspects of
the agreements (article 27 and transitory
provisions 6 and 10).

The 2012 Treaty Between Mexico
and the United States

In December 2013, just a couple of
days after the Mexican Congress adopted
the energy reform, the U.S. Congress approved as part of the Bipartisan Budget Act
of 2013 the integration of the Agreement
Between the United States and Mexico
Concerning the Transboundary Hydrocarbon Reservoirs in the Gulf of Mexico.4
With this act, the treaty that took more
than twenty years to negotiate and was
signed in 2012 entered into force between
both countries and regulates the resources
that, according to international law, both
States are entitled to exploit.5 The treaty,
in essence, will change the way the energy
relations between Mexico and the United
States can develop in the future since
it opens the possibility of exploiting an
estimate of 172 million barrels contained
in deep water reservoirs.6 Furthermore,
it places the security of the hydrocarbon
resources located in the Gulf of Mexico under the protection of an international treaty
and fosters a joint development between
Mexico and the United States to exploit
them efficiently, equitably, and in a secure
way. There are many aspects of the treaty
that are interesting for the development of
international law in the matter, but for the
sake of this article, four points are relevant
and need to be stressed to avoid future
conflicts between both States.
First, the treaty’s heart and soul is
located in its preamble, where it states the
principles that will guide the life of the legal
framework of the treaty to archive “safe,
efficient, equitable and environmentally
responsible exploitation of transboundary
hydrocarbon reservoirs.” The treaty does
not expand on what the parties consider
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to be an “efficient,” “equitable,” “safe,” or
“environmentally responsible” exploitation,
hence it leaves open to interpretation how
these principles might develop in the life of
the treaty. This has several risks in light of
the energy reform: for example, by not determining the understanding of each principle and by not hierarchizing them, the
operators of the agreement, or an arbitrator
if a dispute arises, will have to interpret
each one and balance them in case there is
conflict. What if the unitization agreement
is efficient but not safe or environmentally
responsible? What if it is equitable but
inefficient? And even more important for
the sake of the energy reform, what if the
domestic legislation in Mexico defines efficiency in terms of government revenues
and not in terms of profitability to the
private contractors? The answers cannot be
obtained from the language drafted in the
treaty and hence are left subject to interpretation.
Second, to achieve the above-mentioned principles, Mexico and the United
States agreed that the treaty would design
“cooperative agreements based primarily
on principles of unitization.” Articles 6 and
7 of the treaty establish the process to sign
and the content of the unitization agreements. In essence, they must be negotiated
by the licensees from each side of the border treating the reservoir as a unit, which
entails that the States must share the costs
and the profits of its exploitation equitably.
In addition, the unitization contracts proposed by the licensees must be approved
by each of the State agencies. This raises
several questions in the face of the energy
reform. The regulatory framework of the
reform must include a chapter that deals
with the contracts in the borderline with
the United States. The way things stand
today, it is unclear the type of contractual
relationship that the Mexican government
could have with private companies in
those areas that could respect the agreement signed with the United States. The

treaty only mentions one type of contract:
licenses. But the Mexican legislation, as
explained above, contains several options,
and each one, according to the reform,
must maximize in the long term the government’s profit from the exploitation of
these resources. Balancing the rights of the
State, the rights of the contractors, and the
provisions of unification in the treaty is going to be a hard task and must be addressed
in the secondary legislation if the Mexican
State wants to avoid a dispute with the
United States on the issue.
Finally, the dispute resolution mechanisms of the treaty are far from efficient.
For instance, the treaty created a Joint
Commission to determine many elements
of the life of the treaty, including resolving
disputes regarding its interpretation. This,
however, does not make the Commission
a strong and independent body; in fact,
it’s the opposite. The members of the Joint
Commission are designated by the parties,
but there are no qualification requirements
regarding them; the Commission is composed of four members, two designated
by each State, and does not contain any
procedure in case its decisions are locked.
In the case the Commission is unable to
reach an agreement in many aspects of
the treaty, the issue is thrown back to the
parties or to an arbitrator—only if it’s a
technical issue it is resolved by an expert.
Finally, the Commission does not have an
independent budget and each State has to
financially support its designated members.
Hence, as opposed to being an independent
and strong body that could make unbiased
decisions on the benefit of the treaty’s life,
the Joint Commission is closer to a binational political commission that tries to coordinate policies but has almost no power
over the parties. Mexico and the United
States have done better in the past when it
comes to creating this type of organism. In
fact, in a very similar situation, the case of
transboundary rivers, both States signed an
agreement back in 1944 where they created
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a commission with the rank of an “international organization” that has a joint budget
to technically determine apportionment of
inland water between both countries.7 This
binational organization has been relatively
efficient in its tasks and has been able to
work even under pressure of governors,
mayors, and farmers on both sides of the
border.8

The Protection of Foreign Investors
in Mexico

Mexico has signed more than thirty
bilateral investment treaties and several
free trade agreements that contain a section on the protection of investment, like
Chapter 11 of NAFTA, where in essence
the State agrees to give foreign investors a
particular set of rights and legal resources.9
In general, these include the right to a fair
and equitable treatment, principles on the
procedure and calculation of compensation for expropriations, nondiscrimination,
national treatment, and full protection
and security of their investment.10 Most
importantly these treaties give the right to
the foreign investor to initiate mandatory
arbitration proceedings against the government if the investor considers that his or
her rights have been violated due to state
action or inaction. Mexico has been found
guilty in the past for certain acts against
foreign investors and has paid a substantial
amount of money in damages and compensation.11 Nevertheless, one of the industries
that was excluded from these treaties was
the hydrocarbon sector. This is so because
it was considered that only Pemex would
develop activities in these areas and that
foreign investment was expressly forbidden
in this area.
With the entry into force of both the
treaty of 2012 and the energy reform of
2013, questions will emerge regarding the
protection of the investors that will be subject to both regimes. In principle, international foreign investment law protects the
contracts signed by the investors with the
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government.12 These are considered as any
other investment in the foreign country.
The risk with the energy reform now is that
if the secondary legislation is not drafted
in an efficient way, clearly establishing the
type of acts that the government can take—
such as forcing a unification agreement in
the borderline, for instance—international
disputes could arise in the future. For
example, if a petroleum company agrees
to invest in Mexico under certain terms,
and the government decides to correct the
agreement to regain control of the production of the field or it modifies the legal context in which the investment was done in
the future, then Mexico could face claims
in an international investment arbitral
tribunal. This has happened in the past to
other countries in the region. It is not uncommon to find stories of Latin American
governments that decide to open particular
sectors of the economy that were previously fully controlled by the State and then
change their minds years later when they
realize that the reforms are too aggressive
and that they left the government on the
wrong side of the equation. Any amendments to the legislative and contractual
context when the foreign investor arrived
to the State can be translated into claims
of breaches of a BIT and hence the State
would have to pay damages and compensation for modifying its policies. Examples
of the above can be found in the case of
Ecuador when it modified its fiscal law
on the exploitation of hydrocarbons13 and
Venezuela when it modified its national
hydrocarbons law to strengthen the control
of the State over the exploitation of the oil
fields in the Orinoco Belt.14

Conclusion

If the purpose of the 2012 treaty and
the 2013 energy reform is to expand the
investment in the hydrocarbon sector of
Mexico, then a deep study and understanding of the international law implications of
these innovations is necessary. The risk of
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making a mistake or of being too ambiguous regarding the policies adopted and the
legislation implemented could provoke
several claims and years of costly litigation
with the U.S. government or with foreign
investors. This story has been told before in
the region, there is no need to replicate it
in Mexico if things are done appropriately.
On the contrary, if Mexico is able to draft a
modern secondary law that integrates more
deeply the energy relation with the United
States and foreign companies in an efficient, equitable, and secure way, the future
of the North American regions could be
secured and it could serve as an excellent
model for other relations. For example, it
is a fact that transboundary resources are
also located with the borders of other parts
of the Gulf, like the borderlines between
Mexico, the United States, and Cuba, or the
borderline between Guatemala and Mexico.
Furthermore, the shale gas reservoirs in
the borderline between Mexico and the
United States could also benefit from the
experience that the exploitation of the
fields according to the treaty of 2012 could
bring.
If things are done in an inappropriate
manner and Mexico is forced to modify
legal contexts after the investments are
done or if the agreements in the borderline
end up in claims tribunals, then the political turmoil in Mexico when the news of the
arbitrations are out will force the State to go
back to nationalistic rhetoric that can only
bring more tension to the region. Rather
than being an example of the development
of a secure energy region, Mexico will
become one more case of a wrongly implemented opening to foreign investment and
a consequent fall back into nationalistic
policies that not only keeps the State from
using its resources efficiently but that translates into litigation that could eventually
cost millions of dollars of national income
in damages and compensation.
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